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Why does decision making differ among individuals? People sometimes make seemingly
inconsistent decisions with lower expected (monetary) utility even when objective
information of probabilities and reward are provided. It is noteworthy, however, that
a certain proportion of people do not provide anomalous responses, choosing the
alternatives with higher expected utility, thus appearing to be more “rational.” We
investigated the genetic and environmental influences on these types of individual
differences in decision making using a classical Allais problem task. Participants
were 1,199 Japanese adult twins aged 20–47. Univariate genetic analysis revealed
that approximately a third of the Allais problem response variance was explained
by genetic factors and the rest by environmental factors unique to individuals and
measurement error. The environmental factor shared between families did not contribute
to the variance. Subsequent multivariate genetic analysis clarified that decision making
using the expected utility theory was associated with general intelligence and that
the association was largely mediated by the same genetic factor. We approach the
mechanism underlying two types of “rational” decision making from the perspective of
genetic correlations with cognitive abilities.
Keywords: decision making, Allais problem, expected utility theory, prospect theory, cognitive ability, twin,
behavioral genetics
INTRODUCTION
We know that human decision making is often inconsistent and violates the rational assumptions
of economics (e.g., Allais, 1953, 1979; Ellsberg, 1961). Behavioral economists argue that the
traditional view of Homo economicus does not apply to human decision-making behavior
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). However, we also know that decision making for some people
appears to be more consistent and “rational” than for others. In addition, the very deﬁnition of
rationality is a target of intense controversy (e.g., Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Stanovich andWest, 2000).
The present study focuses on individual diﬀerences in decision making in economic behavior and
attempts to identify their source, taking into account individual genetic diﬀerences. In doing so, we
will argue that a certain type of rational decision making is associated with cognitive abilities and
that the association is genetically mediated.
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In the current post-genomic era, people are more aware
of the importance of genetics as the source of diﬀerences in
human behavior. In fact, behavioral genetic studies worldwide
have revealed that in any population subjected to study, more
than half of the total variance in intelligence (e.g., Bouchard and
McGue, 1981) and nearly half of the total variance in personality
(e.g., Bouchard and Loehlin, 2001) are explained by individual
diﬀerences in genes. With such a high genetic eﬀect, human
psychological traits, particularly intelligence and personality, are
known to be relatively stable across age within the individual.
Decision making is no exception. Using the twin method,
which compares the similarity of responses between identical
twin pairs and fraternal twin pairs, substantial genetic inﬂuences
on imaginary decision-making tasks in the ﬁeld of behavioral
economics, and real-life economic decision-making behavior,
have been reported in recent behavioral genetic studies. For
example, a third of the variance in investment behavior, such
as participation in the stock market and asset allocation, can
be explained by a genetic factor (Barnea et al., 2010). Savings
behavior is 35% genetic (Cronqvist and Siegel, 2013) and
investment portfolio risk behavior 25% (Cesarini et al., 2010).
Behavioral genetic studies on economic games in laboratory
experiments have produced similar results. For instance, Cesarini
et al. (2008) conducted trust game experiments in two countries
and revealed that the heritability of trust was 32% for the Swedish
study and 17% for the USA study; heritabilities of trustworthiness
were 20 and 10%, respectively. Wallace et al. (2007) estimated the
heritability of responses on an ultimatum game. They revealed
that the minimum acceptance threshold, the smallest amount
of money below which one will reject an oﬀer of money, is
42% genetic. A review of the genetic eﬀect on economic games
reported that strategies and fundamental economic preference
for trust, dictator, and ultimatum games were all genetic, with
heritabilities ranging from 18 to 42% (Cesarini et al., 2009a).
However, genetic eﬀects are not always a signiﬁcant source of
individual diﬀerences in decision making in economic behavior.
Simonson and Sela (2011) found no genetic eﬀects for some
features of consumer judgment and choice.
Although there are some exceptions or diﬀerences in degree,
ample empirical evidence suggests a genetic foundation for
individual diﬀerences in decision making in economic behavior.
Genes do matter for human decision making. It is unreasonable
to assume that genes contribute to speciﬁc decisions or choices;
however, we can assume that decision making is genetic
because its mechanism reﬂects some intrinsic, human genetic
predispositions.
Behavioral economic studies occasionally refer to preferences
as individual innate stable dispositions underlying decision-
making behavior and attribute genetic inﬂuences on decision
making to genetic factors underlying personal preferences.
In one study examining the source of investment behavior,
the genetics of asset allocation behavior were interpreted as
deriving from the genetics of risk preferences (Barnea et al.,
2010). Giving and risk-taking preferences elicited by several
economic games were identiﬁed as genetic with a heritability
of around 20% (Cesarini et al., 2009b). A large genetic
eﬀect was also found for economic risk-taking preferences
across economic decision-making tasks (Zyphur et al., 2009).
It has been proposed that heritable individual diﬀerences
in “prudence” are an underlying common factor in some
features of consumer judgment and choice (Simonson and Sela,
2011).
In the present study, we assume that cognitive ability
is another predisposition that underlies decision making in
economic behavior. Under the presumption that people with
diﬀerent general cognitive ability levels should make diﬀerent
decisions, Frederick (2005) demonstrated that decision making
with respect to time preferences and risk preferences was
associated with cognitive ability. In fact, Yamagishi et al.
(2014) revealed that those who make economically rational
choices, earning more money while disregarding their partner’s
earnings on economic games, had better scores on an IQ
test. Cesarini et al. (2012) examined the association between
behavioral anomalies and cognitive abilities. They found that
some individual diﬀerences in anomalies (illusion of control,
insensitivity to sample size, and representativeness) were
correlated with cognitive ability as a result of a common genetic
basis, not because of a common environmental function.
Considering this background, we predict that human decision
making in economic behavior is inﬂuenced by genetics and that
the genetic factor is at least in part derived from genetic inﬂuences
on cognitive ability. To test these hypotheses, it is necessary to
empirically show that the two observed variables of decision
making and cognitive ability are correlated at the genetic factor
level.
To achieve this goal, we employed the twin method, the most
commonly used approach in behavior genetics, and measured
both cognitive ability and decision making from the same twins.
Bivariate genetic analysis with behavior genetic designs enables
us to examine the extent to which genetic and environmental
sources mediate the phenotypic covariance between the two
variables.
To classify individual decision making into speciﬁc patterns,
we employed the Allais (1953, 1979) problem. The Allais problem
is the earliest and best-known paradox frequently introduced as
a human decision-making task that demonstrates the violation
of the axioms of expected utility theory (EUT). The problem
consists of two questions. In the ﬁrst question, the respondents
are required to choose which they prefer in a lottery (gamble)
between the options A and B. The options are depicted as follows:
Option A: One million dollars for sure
Option B: 89% probability of 1 million dollars
10% probability of 5 million dollars
1% probability of nothing.
Then, in the second question, the respondents are again
required to choose which they prefer in a lottery (gamble)
between the options C and D. The options are described as
follows:
Option C: 11% probability of 1 million dollars
89% probability of nothing
Option D: 10% probability of 5 million dollars
90% probability of nothing.
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Allais found that most people choose A from the ﬁrst question
and D from the second question (AD). Although the outcome of
the 89% slice of probability is the same in A and B as it is in C
and D, choosing A rather than B on the one hand, and choosing
D rather than C on the other hand is conﬂicting; Allais calls this
a paradox.
The Allais problem has been administered under many
diﬀerent conditions (e.g., Slovic and Tversky, 1974; Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979; Camerer, 1989; Conlisk, 1989; Wu and
Gonzalez, 1998; Birnbaum, 2004; Stanovich and West, 2008;
Huck and Müller, 2012), and the results repeatedly demonstrate
the paradox. For instance, a study with American university
students demonstrated that the most frequently chosen
combination pattern was AD (43.6%), followed by BD (41.9%),
then AC (7.6%), and BC, which was the least frequently chosen
(6.8%; Conlisk, 1989). More recently, another study using an
internet survey with a representative sample of the Dutch
population over 15 years of age found the distribution of
frequency ratio to be 33.9% for AD, 30.2% for BD, 20.4% for AC,
and 15.5% for BC, when the currency of dollars in the original
Allais problem was replaced with Euros (Huck and Müller,
2012).
It is noteworthy that what constitutes the “rational” choice
on the Allais problem is not necessarily straightforward. As
mentioned above, the combination of BD is in accordance with
the EUT; thus appears to be rational. However, selecting AC
can also be considered rational if we take into account the
respondent’s preference for more certain reward rather than
larger reward; the probability of gaining somemoney is higher for
A than for B in the ﬁrst choice, and it is higher for C than for D
in the second choice. In addition, even the AD choice, the choice
that Allais called the paradox, can be considered rational from
the perspective of the prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). The only choice for which no explanation can be provided
is the BC choice.
The fact that no study has found robust correlations between
the Allais problem and cognitive ability (e.g., Slovic and Tversky,
1974; Stanovich andWest, 2000, 2008) may reﬂect this ambiguity
regarding the problem’s rationality. It may be the case that one
rational response pattern (e.g., BD choice) reﬂects the person’s
cognitive ability while the others do not. We need to examine
the relationships between each of the Allais problem response
patterns and cognitive ability separately.
Additionally, it is also possible that the lack of robust ﬁndings
is a product of biased samples and inadequate indices of general
cognitive ability. For instance, using university students and their
SAT scores, Stanovich and West (2008) found no signiﬁcant
associations between the response to the Allais problem and
cognitive ability, and argued that the correlation between the
two is elusive. Looking at the data closely, however, their results
suggest that higher cognitive ability individuals (the high-SAT
group) made more EUT compatible choices (choosing D instead
of C in the second question). In fact, the statistical analysis
approached signiﬁcance (p= 0.073).
The association between education and the response pattern of
the Allais problem also appears to be unclear. Huck and Müller
(2012), elucidating that earlier research on the Allais problem
has been carried out solely using student samples, examined
demographic characteristics for those who violated the EUT
using a large representative sample. They showed that although
no diﬀerence was found in education level among the response
patterns in the original version of the Allais problem where very
high payoﬀs were hypothesized, higher education had an eﬀect
on reducing the violation of EUT in the revised version with
downscaled payoﬀs (1 and 5 Euro instead of 1 and 5million Euro;
Huck and Müller, 2012).
Given the current state of the ﬁeld, we decided to explore
in depth the relationships between the Allais problem response
patterns and general cognitive ability using samples with large
variation in cognitive ability and valid cognitive ability tests as
general intelligence indices.
To investigate logical nature of rationality, it is necessary to
examine the relationships between the Allais problem response
patterns and basic logical inference ability. As a basic logical task,
it would be natural to use the syllogism-solving task, in which
respondents are asked to determine if, under given assumptions,
a conclusion is logically inferred, rather than just consistent
with an assumption. The syllogism-solving task is a natural
choice because (i) it provides the most traditional normative
model of logical inference (dating back to Aristotle in the fourth
century BC); (ii) it has been widely used for many decades by
experimental psychologists for the study of logical inferences; (iii)
it is still considered to constitute the core part of logical reasoning
with ordinary language (see, Mineshima et al., 2012).
We examined the distribution of response patterns to the
Allais problem and conﬁrmed whether the paradox replicated in
the West was also apparent in a Japanese sample. To the authors’
knowledge, there is no report on the distribution of Japanese
response patterns for the Allais problem. Univariate genetic
analyses with a behavioral genetic approach were conducted on
each response pattern, to clarify the genetic and environmental
eﬀects that contributed to the decision making. Subsequently,
we investigated the association between response patterns and
cognitive ability. The sample in the present study comprised
twins with ample variation in educational backgrounds. The
cognitive ability tests we used included ones that measured not
only general intelligence but also syllogistic inference ability with
high reliability and validity. The mean level of performance on
each cognitive ability test was compared among the response
patterns. Bivariate genetic analyses were conducted to clarify the
genetic and environmental overlap between cognitive ability and
decision making.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
The participants were 1,199 (886 female and 313 male) Japanese
adult twins registered with the Keio Twin Study (KTS; Shikishima
et al., 2006; Ando et al., 2013). The KTS recruited 14–30-
years-old twin participants through population-based registries
in some parts of the Tokyo area from 1998 to 2011. After
recruitment, the registrants were assessed by questionnaires
delivered via mail surveys and by cognitive ability tests or
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physical measurements administered at the university. The Allais
problem was included in the comprehensive postal survey
conducted by the KTS in 2012. The age of the survey respondents
ranged from 20 to 47, with a mean of 26.57 and standardized
deviation of 4.94. The distribution of respondents’ educational
attainment level was junior high school 1%, high school 10%,
junior/technical/vocational college 29%, university 54%, and
graduate school 6%.
The zygosity of each same-sex twin pair was initially diagnosed
by a three-items questionnaire based on physical resemblance
(Ooki et al., 1990). Gene polymorphisms were examined in nearly
half the pairs. It was conﬁrmed that 93.3% of these DNA-based
diagnoses were in agreement with the initial questionnaire-based
diagnoses. As a result, the eﬀective number of complete twin pairs
who responded to the Allais problemwas broken down as follows:
291 female monozygotic (MZ), 85 male MZ, 72 female dizygotic
(DZ), 15 male DZ, and 56 opposite-sex DZ pairs.
Among them, nearly half (184 MZ and 68 DZ) of the pairs
had also participated in the on-campus cognitive test session
in 2006–2011 and provided IQ data. Nearly 90% (334 MZ and
121 DZ) of the pairs had also responded to the postal survey
administered in 2010–2011, which included the syllogism-solving
test and provided syllogistic inference ability data.
The participants were informed of the purpose of the study,
the research items, protection of their privacy, and their right to
cancel their participation at any time. Signed informed consent
was obtained for all participants at the beginning of each survey.
All research procedures were approved by the ethics committee
at the Faculty of Letters, Keio University.
Measures
The Allais Problem
The two Allais problem questions, each of which consists of
two options, were translated into Japanese. We calculated an
approximately equivalent amount of money in Japanese currency
and speciﬁed 100,000,000 instead of 1 million dollars. The
participants were required to choose which option they preferred
in the lottery between A and B, and then between C and
D. It should be noted that the relatively smaller contribution
of genetics to decision making compared to intelligence and
personality is in part attributable to the larger component of
measurement error, and that adjusting the measurement error
by employing test–retest data would double the estimate for
genetic eﬀects (Beauchamp et al., 2011). To check the test–retest
reliability of the Allais problem, we administered it twice with
an interval of 4 months to 174 individuals from the sample.
The concordance rate was 0.68, which allows us to estimate the
variance for measurement error as 0.32. For individuals who had
completed the problem twice, the ﬁrst responses were used in the
subsequent analyses.
Cognitive Ability Measures
We used IQ test scores and syllogism-solving test scores as
cognitive ability measures. The IQ test was the full version of the
Kyodai Nx 15- (Osaka and Umemoto, 1984; Lynn et al., 1987),
one of the most popular group intelligence tests in Japan for
participants over the age of 15. There are 12 subtests altogether.
The individual scores of each subtest of the Kyodai Nx 15- were
converted to standardized T scores, with a mean of 50 and
standard deviation of 10, by following the score conversion chart
attached to the scoring manual.
Following the principal component analysis with promax
rotation conducted for all 12 subtests of the Kyodai Nx 15-,
we used Verbal IQ and Spatial IQ indices (Shikishima et al.,
2009). The Verbal IQmeasure comprised the total standardized T
score for the following four subtests: Word completion, Sentence
completion, Antonym or synonym, and Rearrangement of words.
The Spatial IQ measure comprised the total standardized T
score for the following four subtests: Punching a folded paper,
Figure combination, Combination of ﬁgure and letter plates, and
Sociogram. The full IQ score with a mean of 100 and standard
deviation of 15 was computed from total T scores of the
12 subtests, which also included Memory, Matrix, Calculation
method, and Index conversion as well as Verbal and Spatial
subtests, by following the IQ conversion chart. As we found a
mean full IQ score of 101.66 and a standard deviation of 13.84,
it was assumed that, in terms of the intelligence test scores, our
twin sample was fairly representative of the general population.
The syllogism-solving test administered consisted of the ﬁve
problems of the BAROCO Short (Shikishima et al., 2011).
Syllogisms are a form of argument relating three terms that
consist of two premises and a conclusion. Research indicates
that syllogistic inference ability highly reﬂects a person’s general
intelligence (Shikishima et al., 2009), and that performance on
only ﬁve questions of the self-administered syllogism-solving test
can be a useful index of general cognitive ability, which enables
us to collect cognitive ability data more easily from more people
compared with using IQ tests. The total score from the ﬁve
problems, ranging from 0 points (all incorrect) to 5 points (all
correct), was used in the analysis.
Statistical Analysis
Univariate Genetic Analysis
We conducted univariate genetic analyses on each choice of the
Allais problem response combinations. With the usual analysis
on a continuous variable, the phenotypic variance (VP) of the
variable can be partitioned into three variance components:
additive genetic (VA), shared environmental (VC), and non-
shared environmental (VE), which can be formulated as follows
(Neale and Maes, 2002):
Vp = VA + VC + VE
The additive genetic variance reﬂects variation in multiple
genotypes whose inﬂuences are small and additive to form
a quantitative phenotype. The shared environmental variance
refers to the variation in environmental characteristics that
makes family members alike and that diﬀers from family to
family. In contrast, the non-shared environmental variance
reﬂects variation in environmental characteristics that makes
family members diﬀerent even if they live together. All the
measurement error components are also included in the non-
shared environmental variance.
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The diﬀerence in genetic resemblance between MZ and
DZ twin siblings (sharing 100 and 50%, respectively, of
their segregating genes), and the equivalence in environmental
resemblance for the two types of twins, can yield the following
two equations concerning the observed covariances for MZ
(CovMZ) and DZ (CovDZ) twin siblings:
CovMZ =VA + VC
CovDZ = 0.5VA + VC
The estimates of the three parameters, VA, VC, and VE, can be
computed by solving the above three equations.
In the present study, because the variable is binary, we
applied an analytical method for categorical data (Rijsdijk and
Sham, 2002) in the univariate genetic analysis. Total variance is
constrained to unity, and the tetrachoric twin correlations using
the threshold model (Cesarini et al., 2009a) are computed for
both MZ and DZ twin pairs. The relative contribution of each
parameter (i.e., A,C, and E) for each response combination of the
Allais problem can be estimated by solving these coeﬃcients (i.e.,
a2, c2, and e2) of the best ﬁtting model with structural equation
modeling using the maximum likelihood method (see Neale and
Maes, 2002, for more details). The Mx software package was
utilized for genetic analyses (Neale, 2004).
Bivariate Genetic Analysis
We conducted bivariate genetic analyses on each choice of the
response combinations to the Allais problem and the cognitive
test score to explore the extent to which underlying genetic and
environmental factors mediate the phenotypic association, using
Cholesky decompositions (Neale and Maes, 2002). With this
technique, it is possible to estimate the relative degree to which
the genetic eﬀects on decision making overlap the genetic eﬀects
on cognitive ability, yielding a genetic correlation coeﬃcient
(rG). The shared environmental correlation (rC) and non-shared
environmental correlation (rE) can be likewise obtained (for an
explanation of rG, rC, and rE, see Neale and Maes, 2002). In the
present study, because the decision-making data were binary and
the cognitive ability data were continuous, polyserial correlations
for both MZ and DZ twin pairs were used in the bivariate genetic
analyses.
We highlighted the estimates whose 95% conﬁdence intervals
did not include zero (conﬁdence intervals including zero indicate
equivocal results, because they could signify small correlations
or large standard errors as a result of the small variance
components).
RESULTS
Basic Statistics
The distribution of the responses for each of the two Allais
problem questions is shown in Table 1. For the ﬁrst question,
twice as many respondents preferred certainty (A) to expected
utility (B; 67% vs. 33%). For the second question, three times
as many respondents preferred expected utility (D) to preferred
certainty (C; 76% vs. 24%).
TABLE 1 | Cross tabulation of the two Allais problem responses.
Second question Total
C D
First question A 215 593 808
% of total 18% 49% 67%
B 74 317 391
% of total 6% 26% 33%
Total Count 289 910 1199
% of total 24% 76% 100%
For the combination of the two responses, the most frequently
observed pattern, though not quite a majority choice, was
AD (49%), which violates the EUT. The Allais paradox was
therefore reproduced in the present study. The second most
frequent pattern was BD (26%), which accords with the
EUT. Fewer participants consistently preferred certainty (AC;
18%) and those who chose randomly (BC) were the smallest
group (6%).
Univariate Genetic Analysis
The model-ﬁtting analysis of the threshold model revealed that
for both response combinations of AD and BD the threshold
between the response categories (i.e., the choice of AD or non-
AD and BD or non-BD, respectively) should be set equal across
twin sibling order and type of twin (MZ and DZ; Table 2). The
response combinations of AC and BC were excluded from the
genetic analysis due to insuﬃcient number of cases.
The tetrachoric twin correlation for the response combination
choice AD was 0.24 for MZ twins and 0.12 for DZ twins. For
the response combination BD, it was 0.35 for MZ twins and
0.18 for DZ twins. The AE model, in which the eﬀect of shared
environment (C) is not hypothesized, ﬁtted best among all the
models tested for both AD and BD.
The relative proportions of genetics (A) and non-shared
environment (E) were estimated to be 23% and 77% for the choice
of AD and 36 and 64% for the choice of BD, respectively (Table 3).
If we take into account the measurement error estimated from the
Allais problem test–retest reliability, for ADmore than a half and
for BD more than two thirds of the variance of the true score for
the Allais problem can be inferred as genetic (for the correction of
the contribution from the test–retest reliability, see Plomin et al.,
2001).
Mean Comparisons
Associations between Allais problem response combinations
and full IQ, Verbal IQ, and Spatial IQ scores are shown
graphically in Figure 1. The one-way ANOVAmean comparison
tests of full IQ, Verbal IQ, and Spatial IQ scores among the
four response combinations were all signiﬁcant (p < 0.001,
p < 0.05, and p < 0.001, respectively). Subsequent multiple
comparisons with Bonferroni corrections showed that full IQ
and Spatial IQ scores for those who chose BD, which reﬂects
the EUT, were signiﬁcantly higher than for those who chose
AC (p < 0.05) and BC (p < 0.001), but the diﬀerence was
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TABLE 2 | Model fitting for the response combinations AD/non-AD and BD/non-BD.
Model −2LL df AIC χ2 df p AIC
Response combination of AD/non-D
Saturated ACE 1650.49 193 −735.51
Equal threshold between order 1 and 2, between MZ and DZ ACE 1653.09 1196 −738.91 2.60 3 0.46 −3.41
AE 1653.09 1197 −740.91 2.60 4 0.63 −5.41
CE 1654.84 1197 −739.16 4.35 4 0.36 −3.66
E 1662.03 1198 −733.97 11.54 5 0.04 1.53
Response combination of BD/non-BD
Saturated ACE 1365.42 1193 −1020.58
Equal threshold between order 1 and 2, between MZ and DZ ACE 1368.82 1196 −1023.18 3.40 3 0.33 −2.60
AE 1368.82 1197 −1025.18 3.40 4 0.49 −4.60
CE 1371.27 1197 −1022.73 5.85 4 0.21 −2.15
E 1385.07 1198 −1010.93 19.65 5 0.001 9.65
All x2 difference testing compares the fit of the Saturated Model to subsequent models; −2LL, log likelihood fit statistic; df, degrees of freedom; AIC, Akaike information
criterion. A smaller value of AIC indicates a better fit to data. The best-fitting model is shown in bold.
TABLE 3 | Parameter estimates for the best-fitting model.
Category Threshold rMZ rDZ Genetic (A) Shared environmental (C) Non-shared environmental (E)
AD/non-AD 0.01 0.24 0.12 0.23 – 0.77
(0.08, 0.37) (0.63, 0.92)
BD/non-BD 0.62 0.36 0.18 0.36 – 0.64
(0.19, 0.51) (0.49, 0.81)
95% confidence intervals are shown in parentheses.
not signiﬁcant for AD. However, full IQ scores for those who
chose BC were signiﬁcantly lower than for those who chose other
combinations (p < 0.05 for AC, p< 0.001 for AD, and p< 0.001
for BD).
The comparison of Verbal IQ scores showed that the scores
for those who chose BD were signiﬁcantly higher than for those
who chose BC (p < 0.01), but the diﬀerence was not signiﬁcant
for AC and AD. The scores for those who chose BC were
signiﬁcantly lower than for those who chose AD (p < 0.05) and
BD (p< 0.01).
Associations between the Allais problem response
combinations and syllogism-solving test scores are shown
in Figure 1. With an increased number of cases, the pattern
was the same as that for IQ scores. The one-way ANOVA
mean comparison test among the four response combinations
was signiﬁcant (p < 0.01). The multiple comparisons with
Bonferroni corrections showed that scores for those who chose
BD were signiﬁcantly higher than for those who chose AC
(p< 0.05).
Bivariate Genetic Analysis
Bivariate genetic analyses of the relationship between the Allais
problem response combinations and the four cognitive ability
measures revealed that the choice of BD was signiﬁcantly
correlated with full IQ (r = 0.34), Spatial IQ (r = 0.57), and
syllogistic inference ability (r = 0.28) at the genetic factor
level, but no correlation was found at the environmental
factor level (Table 4). The choice of the AD response
combination indicated that there were no associations with
cognitive ability measures at the genetic or environmental factor
levels.
DISCUSSION
We replicated the Allais paradox in a large Japanese
twin sample with wide variation in cognitive ability.
The relative frequency distribution of each response
pattern was generally similar to those reported in Western
populations (Conlisk, 1989; Huck and Müller, 2012).
That is, we found that the PT compatible AD choice
was the most frequently chosen, followed by the EUT
compatible BD choice. The AC and BC choices were in the
minority.
Using the twin method, we revealed that the individual
diﬀerences in the response pattern of the Allais problem were
inﬂuenced by genetics. The heritability of the AD choice was
estimated to be 23 and 36% for the BD choice. When the
measurement error was taken into account, the heritability
estimates increased to more than 50 and 60%, respectively.
Yet, neither was perfectly genetic (100% heritable) and the
remaining inﬂuences were explained by non-shared or random
environmental factors. There were no shared environmental or
family inﬂuences for either of the strategy choices. This result is in
accord with the “three laws of behavioral genetics” (Turkheimer,
2000); that is, (i) all human behavioral traits are genetic, (ii)
shared environmental eﬀects are smaller than genetic eﬀects, and
(iii) non-shared environmental eﬀects are substantial. Therefore,
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FIGURE 1 | Cognitive test scores and Allais problem response combinations. Error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals.
TABLE 4 | Genetic and non-shared environmental correlations between
response combination and cognitive ability.
Genetic Non-shared
environmental
AD/non-AD and full IQ 0.07 (−0.21, 0.37) −0.01 (−0.15, 0.13)
AD/non-AD and verbal IQ 0.06 (−0.22, 0.38) 0.02 (−0.12, 0.15)
AD/non-AD and spatial IQ −0.08 (−0.41, 0.21) 0.11 (−0.03, 0.25)
AD/non-AD and syllogism solving 0.22 (−0.05, 0.53) −0.01 (−0.11, 0.09)
BD/non-BD and full IQ 0.34 (0.13, 0.56) 0.07 (−0.07, 0.21)
BD/non-BD and verbal IQ 0.14 (−0.08, 0.36) 0.06 (−0.08, 0.20)
BD/non-BD and spatial IQ 0.57 (0.34, 0.85) −0.12 (−0.26, 0.02)
BD/non-BD and syllogism solving 0.28 (0.07, 0.49) −0.03 (−0.13, 0.07)
95% confidence intervals are shown in parentheses. Coefficients whose confidence
intervals did not include zero are shown in bold.
from a behavioral genetic perspective, the causes of individual
diﬀerences in decision making in economic behavior are not
exceptional; rather, they are standard for human behavioral traits.
The results also demonstrated that individuals’ choices
were related to individual diﬀerences in cognitive ability
(general intelligence or g). It was shown that those who
made the BD choice, which accords with the EUT, achieved
higher scores on the full IQ and spatial IQ than those
who made AC or BC choices. This suggests a signiﬁcant
association between the EUT directed decision making and
general cognitive ability. In addition, participants who made
the PT compatible AD choice and who made the certainty
eﬀect compatible AC choice had higher IQ scores than
those who made the BC choice which probably reﬂected
random responses. This indicates that these non-EUT choices
also require some level of general cognitive ability; in this
sense, they can also be regarded as “reasonable” decision
making.
The bivariate genetic analysis revealed that the relationship
between general cognitive ability and the BD choice was
genetically mediated. The BD choice also had signiﬁcant genetic
correlations with syllogistic inference ability. Put diﬀerently, the
phenotypic association between the BD choice and cognitive
abilities is partially explained by a genetic association. These
results indicate that those who are more intelligent genetically
tend to make decisions according to the EUT. The fact that the
BD choice exhibited a signiﬁcant genetic correlation with Spatial
IQ but not with Verbal IQ suggests that the association between
the two reﬂects a common non-verbal mechanism, which should
be speciﬁed in future work. Furthermore, the genetic correlation
per se does not explain any particular mechanism for how genes
actually operate. It might simply reﬂect the environmental eﬀect
that correlates with a person’s genetics (e.g., genetically intelligent
people tend to receive higher education, with more opportunity
to learn the EUT). Further elaboration is needed to identify the
role of genetics in this regard.
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On the other hand, the AD choice, which was compatible
with the PT, was not genetically related to cognitive ability.
This suggests that the biological/genetic mechanism directing
AD choice is diﬀerent from that of the BD choice. Loomes
and Sugden (1982) proposed regret theory as an alternative
to the PT in explaining why choice of AD is so attractive
in the Allais problem. They purported that an individual’s
capacity to anticipate feelings of regret could be a signiﬁcant
factor in violating the EUT and thus contravening the
axioms of EUT was in fact “rational.” In line with this,
Bourgeois-Gironde (2010) reﬁned this theory from clinical and
neurobiological perspectives. In light of this argument, the
genetic eﬀect observed in choosing AD may reﬂect individual
genetic diﬀerences in susceptibility to rational emotion such as
regret.
Discussions on the individual diﬀerences in decision making
used to focus on the simple question, “who is rational?”
(Stanovich, 1999). However, the very deﬁnition of rationality
is a target of intense discussion. In the current study, we
employed the Allais problem, one of the most famous and
classical economic decision-making tasks, with at least three
types of responses, namely BD, AD, and AC, which can be
regarded as rational depending on the theories and perspectives
one takes. We found that those individuals who provided these
“rational” responses had higher general cognitive ability than
those who made seemingly random and inconsistent responses
(BC). Interestingly, though, we found that only the BD response,
compatible with the EUT, had signiﬁcant genetic correlations
with cognitive abilities. In this sense, it was indicated that those
who are genetically and economically rational (that is, in the
sense of EUT) are those who are genetically intelligent. Taking
another perspective, however, the results showed that non-EUT
type rationality could be explained by genetic factors other than
intelligence. Therefore, it can also be said that those who are
non-EUT rational are those who are genetically disposed with
some non-cognitive abilities, the details of which are yet to be
determined. As Stanovich and West (2008) have suggested, the
answer to the question “who is rational” is complex, and the
current study provides part of the reason for this complexity: this
is possibly because, to a certain extent, each rationality holds its
own genetic foundation.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
CS designed the study, analyzed the data, and drafted the
manuscript. KH interpreted the data and wrote the paper.
SY supported the analysis and interpreted the data. JA and
MO interpreted the data, wrote the paper, and supervised the
project. All authors approved the ﬁnal version of the paper for
submission.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientiﬁc
Research on Innovative Areas: Prediction and Decision Making
(23120002).
REFERENCES
Allais, M. (1953). Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le risque, critique
des postulats et axiomes de l’ecole Americaine. Econometrica 21, 503–546. doi:
10.2307/1907921
Allais, M. (1979). “The so-called Allais paradox and rational decisions under
uncertainty,” in The Expected Utility Hypothesis and the Allais Paradox,
eds M. Allais and O. Hagen (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company),
437–681.
Ando, J., Fujisawa, K., Shikishima, C., Hiraishi, K., Nozaki, M., Yamagata, S., et al.
(2013). Two cohort and three independent anonymous twin projects at the
Keio Twin Research Center (KoTReC). Twin Res. Hum. Genet. 16, 202–216.
doi: 10.1017/thg.2012.131
Barnea, A., Cronqvist, H., and Siegel, S. (2010). Nature or nurture:
what determines investor behavior? J. Financ. Econ. 98, 583–604. doi:
10.1016/j.jﬁneco.2010.08.001
Beauchamp, J. P., Cesarini, D., Johannesson, M., van der Loos, M. J. H. M.,
Koellinger, P. D., Groenen, P. J. F., et al. (2011). Molecular genetics and
economics. J. Econ. Perspect. 25, 57–82. doi: 10.1257/jep.25.4.57
Birnbaum, M. H. (2004). Causes of Allais common consequence
paradoxes: an experimental dissection. J. Math. Psychol. 48, 87–106. doi:
10.1016/j.jmp.2004.01.001
Bouchard, T. J., and Loehlin, J. C. (2001). Genes, evolution, and personality. Behav.
Genet. 31, 243–273. doi: 10.1023/A:1012294324713
Bouchard, T. J., and McGue, M. (1981). Familial studies of intelligence: a review.
Science 212, 1055–1059. doi: 10.1126/science.7195071
Bourgeois-Gironde, S. (2010). Regret and the rationality of choices. Philos. Trans.
R. Soc. B. 365, 249–257. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2009.0163
Camerer, C. F. (1989). An experimental test of several generalized utility theories.
J. Risk Uncertain. 2, 61–104. doi: 10.1007/BF00055711
Cesarini, D., Dawes, C. T., Fowler, J. H., Johannesson, M., Lichtenstein, P., and
Wallace, B. (2008). Heritability of cooperative behavior in the trust game. Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 105, 3721–3726. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0710069105
Cesarini, D., Dawes, C. T., Johannesson, M., Lichtenstein, P., and Wallace, B.
(2009a). Experimental game theory and behavior genetics. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci.
1167, 66–75. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04505.x
Cesarini, D., Dawes, C. T., Johannesson, M., Lichtenstein, P., and Wallace, B.
(2009b). Genetic variation in preferences for giving and risk-taking. Q. J. Econ.
124, 809–842. doi: 10.1162/qjec.2009.124.2.809
Cesarini, D., Johannesson, M., Lichtenstein, P., Sandewall, Ö, and Wallace, B.
(2010). Genetic variation in ﬁnancial decision-making. J. Finance 65,
1725–1754. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01592.x
Cesarini, D., Johannesson, M., Magnusson, P. K. E., and Wallace, B. (2012).
The behavioral genetics of behavioral anomalies. Manag. Sci. 58, 21–34. doi:
10.1287/mnsc.1110.1329
Conlisk, J. (1989). Three variants on the Allais example. Am. Econ. Rev. 79,
392–407.
Cronqvist, H., and Siegel, S. (2013). The Origins of Savings Behavior. AFA 2011
Denver Meetings Paper. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1649790
Ellsberg, D. (1961). Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms.Q. J. Econ. 75, 643–669.
doi: 10.2307/1884324
Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reﬂection and decisionmaking. J. Econ. Perspect. 19,
25–42. doi: 10.1257/089533005775196732
Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. M., and Abc Research Group (1999). Simple Heuristics that
Make us Smart. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Huck, S., and Müller, W. (2012). Allais for all: revisiting the paradox in a large
representative sample. J. Risk Uncertain. 44, 261–293. doi: 10.1007/s11166-012-
9142-8
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: an analysis of decision
under risk. Econometrica 47, 263–292. doi: 10.2307/1914185
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 November 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1712
Shikishima et al. Genetics influence economic decision making
Loomes, G., and Sugden, R. (1982). Regret theory: an alternative theory of rational
choice under uncertainty. Econ. J. 92, 805–824. doi: 10.2307/2232669
Lynn, R., Hampson, S., and Bingham, R. (1987). Japanese, British and American
adolescents compared for Spearman’s g and for the verbal, numerical and
visuospatial abilities. Psychologia 30, 137–144.
Mineshima, K., Okada, M., and Takemura, R. (2012). A generalized syllogistic
inference system based on inclusion and exclusion relations. Stud. Log. 100,
753–785. doi: 10.1007/s11225-012-9428-5
Neale, M. C. (2004). Mx Software and Documentation. Available at: http://www.
vcu.edu/mx/
Neale, M. C., and Maes, H. H. M. (2002).Methodology for Genetic Studies of Twins
and Families. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Ooki, S., Yamada, K., Asaka, A., and Hayakawa, K. (1990). Zygosity diagnosis
of twins by questionnaire. Acta Genet. Med. Gemellol. 39, 109–115. doi:
10.1017/S0001566000005626
Osaka, R., and Umemoto, A. (1984). Shintei Kyodai Nx15– dai Nihan [Kyoto
University New Nx15– Intelligence Test]. Tokyo: Taisei Shuppan.
Plomin, R., Kathryn, A., Dip, P. G., and Dunn, J. (2001). Why are children in
the same family so diﬀerent? Unshared environment a decade later. Can. J.
Psychiatry 46, 225–233.
Rijsdijk, F. V., and Sham, P. C. (2002). Analytic approaches to twin
data using structural equation models. Brief. Bioinform. 3, 119–133. doi:
10.1093/bib/3.2.119
Shikishima, C., Ando, J., Ono, Y., Toda, T., and Yoshimura, K. (2006).
Registry of adolescent and young adult twins in the Tokyo area.
Twin Res. Hum. Genet. 9, 811–816. doi: 10.1375/1832427067794
62769
Shikishima, C., Hiraishi, K., Yamagata, S., Sugimoto, Y., Takemura, R., Ozaki, K.,
et al. (2009). Is g an entity? A Japanese twin study using syllogisms and
intelligence tests. Intelligence 37, 256–267. doi: 10.1016/j.intell.2008.10.010
Shikishima, C., Yamagata, S., Hiraishi, K., Sugimoto, Y., Murayama, K.,
and Ando, J. (2011). A simple syllogism-solving test: empirical
ﬁndings and implications for g research. Intelligence 39, 89–99. doi:
10.1016/j.intell.2011.01.002
Simonson, I., and Sela, A. (2011). On the heritability of consumer decisionmaking:
an exploratory approach for studying genetic eﬀects on judgment and choice.
J. Consum. Res. 37, 951–966. doi: 10.1086/657022
Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. (1974). Who accepts Savage’s axiom? Behav. Sci. 19,
368–373. doi: 10.1002/bs.3830190603
Stanovich, K. E. (1999). Who Is Rational? Studies of Individual Diﬀerences in
Reasoning. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Stanovich, K. E., and West, R. F. (2000). Individual diﬀerences in reasoning:
implications for the rationality debate? Behav. Brain Sci. 23, 645–726. doi:
10.1017/S0140525X00003435
Stanovich, K. E., and West, R. F. (2008). On the relative independence of thinking
biases and cognitive ability. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 94, 672–695. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.94.4.672
Turkheimer, E. (2000). Three laws of behavior genetics and what they
mean. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 9, 160–164. doi: 10.1111/1467-872
1.00084
Wallace, B., Cesarini, D., Lichtenstein, P., and Johannesson,M. (2007). Heritability
of ultimatum game responder behavior. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 104,
15631–15634. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0706642104
Wu, G., and Gonzalez, R. (1998). Common consequence conditions in decision
making under risk. J. Risk Uncertain. 16, 115–139. doi: 10.1037/a001
7884
Yamagishi, T., Li, Y., Takagishi, H., Matsumoto, Y., and Kiyonari, T.
(2014). In search of homo economicus. Psychol. Sci. 25, 1699–1711. doi:
10.1177/0956797614538065
Zyphur, M. J., Narayanan, J., Arvey, R. D., and Alexander, G. J. (2009). The
genetics of economic risk preferences. J. Behav. Decis. Mak. 22, 367–377. doi:
10.1002/bdm.643
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or ﬁnancial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conﬂict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Shikishima, Hiraishi, Yamagata, Ando and Okada. This is an
open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original
publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice.
No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 November 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1712
